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CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY KRISTINA DAUGIRDAS AND JULIAN DAVIS MORTENSON
In this section:
• Agreement on Iran Nuclear Program Goes into Effect
• United States and China Reach Agreement Regarding Economic Espionage and International Cybersecurity Norms
• United States Ratifies the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism
• United States Reaches Agreement with Turkey on Use of Incirlik Air Base for Strikes on
ISIL; “Safe Zone” Not Part of the Deal
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Agreement on Iran Nuclear Program Goes into Effect
On September 10, 2015, Senate Democrats blocked a Republican resolution that would
have expressed disapproval of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement
concerning the scope and content of Iran’s nuclear program.1 The failure of that resolution has
paved the way for implementing the JCPOA.
The United States, the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council,
Germany, the European Union, and Iran agreed to the JCPOA on July 14, 2015. Framed as
a political agreement rather than a treaty that imposes legally binding obligations, the JCPOA
significantly limits Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium for the next fifteen years, eases sanctions
imposed by the international community on Iran for its nuclear program, and establishes
mechanisms for oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).2 In May 2015,
Congress had enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA).3 Pursuant to INARA,
Congress has a sixty-day window to review the agreement before President Barack Obama can
waive statutory sanctions by executive action.4 During this window, Congress can enact a joint
resolution favoring the agreement, enact a joint resolution opposing the agreement, or take no
action. If Congress approves the agreement or takes no action, then INARA’s implementation
restrictions would terminate.5 If Congress successfully enacts a joint resolution of disapproval,
however, INARA’s provisions purport to prohibit the president from taking any action to
relieve Iran of statutory sanctions.6 Obama stated that he would “veto any legislation that prevents the successful implementation of this deal.”7
In the weeks that followed the announcement of the JCPOA, numerous Republican legislators—as well as a handful of Democrats— expressed their opposition to it.8 Separately, some
congressional leaders called on Obama to delay a UN Security Council vote to endorse the
JCPOA until after INARA’s review period expired.9 White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest
“strenuously disagree[d]” with the suggestion that the adoption of the Security Council resolution “violat[es] the spirit” of INARA:
1
Jennifer Steinhaur, Democrats Hand Victory to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2015, at
A1. Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 644, 649
(2015). See also Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/245317.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA].
2
JCPOA, supra note 1.
3
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2160e, amended by Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub.
L. No.114 –17, 129 Stat. 201 (2015).
4
Id. § 135(b).
5
Id. §§ 135(c)(2)(A), (C).
6
Id. § 135(c)(2)(B).
7
Remarks on the Multilateral Agreement To Prevent Iran From Developing a Nuclear Weapon, 2015 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 493 ( July 14, 2015). See also Background Conference Call on Iran, THE WHITE HOUSE ( July
14, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/background-conference-call-iran.
8
Carol Morello & Karen DeYoung, Historic Deal Reached with Iran to Limit Nuclear Program, WASH. POST,
July 14, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran-expected-to-be-announced/2015/07/14/5f8dddb2-29ea-11e5-a5ea-cf74396e59ec_story.html.
9
Karen DeYoung, Lawmakers Urge Obama to Delay U.N. Vote on Iran Until Congress Weighs in, WASH.
POST, July 16, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-urge-obama-todelay-un-vote-on-iran-until-congress-weighs-in/2015/07/16/636cdcc0-2bfd-11e5-bd33-395c05608059_
story.html.
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The fact is there actually is an extraordinary provision included in the Security Council
resolution that was adopted by the Security Council today, which is to ensure that the resolution adopted today doesn’t actually go into effect for another 90 days.10 And that is
specifically to allow Congress ample time to conduct their review of the agreement.
And that does show, on the part of the international community, significant deference to
the privileges of individual members of Congress. As I mentioned last week, I would just
note that there is—that the U.N. Security Council resolution that was passed today
doesn’t have an impact on the kind of sanctions that are implemented bilaterally by the
United States. That’s the purview of the President of the United States and the United
States Congress. And again, I think that also reflects the important role that Congress must
play in this debate.11
Administration officials, meanwhile, sought to shore up support for the agreement. On July
23, 2015, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State John
Kerry argued that the JCPOA was the most realistic option available to limit Iran’s nuclear
program—particularly in light of past attempts to negotiate similar agreements—and urged
Congress to support the agreement: “[T]he alternative to the deal that we have reached is
not . . . a ‘better deal,’ some sort of unicorn arrangement involving Iran’s complete capitulation. . . . The choice we face is between an agreement that will ensure Iran’s nuclear program
is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and wholly peaceful, or no deal at all.”12 Kerry acknowledged
that the deal does not address other concerns about Iran: “This plan was designed to address
the nuclear issue, the nuclear issue alone, because we knew that if we got caught up with all the
other issues, we’d never get where we needed to [in order] to stop the nuclear program.”13 However, Kerry stressed the administration has “extensive plans . . . about how we’re going to push
back against Iran’s other activities, against terrorism, its support, its contributions to sectarian
violence in the Middle East and other things.”14
Obama also took steps to persuade Democratic lawmakers to support the agreement. In
addition to hosting ninety House Democrats at the White House in order to answer questions
10

[Editors’ note: The referenced provision is paragraph 43(ii) of S.C. Res. 2231 ( July 20, 2015).]
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 20, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2015/07/20/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-72015.
12
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of John Kerry, Sec’y of State of the United States) [hereinafter Kerry July 23 Testimony]. See also Iran Nuclear
Agreement, The Administration’s Case: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of John Kerry, Sec’y of State of the United States). In remarks in September, Kerry reiterated the point: “So
while it may not happen all at once, it is clear that if we reject this plan, the multilateral sanctions regime will start
to unravel. The pressure on Iran will lessen and our negotiating leverage will diminish, if not disappear. Now, obviously, that is not the path, as some critics would have us believe, to a so-called better deal. It is a path to a much weaker
position for the United States of America and to a much more dangerous Middle East.” Sec’y of State John Kerry,
Remarks on Nuclear Agreement with Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 2, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2015/09/246574.htm.
13
Kerry July 23 Testimony, supra note 12.
14
Id. See also Impacts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on U.S. Interests and the Military Balance
in the Middle East: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Serv., 114th Cong. 22–23, 28 (2015) (statement of Gen.
Martin Dempsey, who noted that “[i]f followed, the deal addresses one critical and the most dangerous point of
friction with the Iranian regime,” while cautioning that “there are at least five other malign activities which give us
and our regional partners concern,” including the pursuit of ballistic missile technology, weapons trafficking, the
use of surrogates and proxies, the use of naval mines and undersea activity, and malicious activity in cyberspace),
available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-66%20-%207-29-15.pdf.
11
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about the agreement,15 Obama sent a letter to Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York in
which he sought to assuage concerns raised by Nadler and other congressional representatives.16 The letter addresses the strength of mechanisms that ensure Iranian compliance with
the JCPOA; enhance joint security efforts between the United States and Israel in the region;
and promote further cooperation among Israel and Gulf countries against Iranian efforts in
Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon:
The JCPOA . . . does not remove any of our options when it comes to preventing Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. . . . Should Iran seek to dash toward a nuclear weapon, all of
the options available to the United States—including the military option—will remain
available through the life of the deal and beyond.
Our support for Israel is also an important element in deterring Iran from ever seeking a
nuclear weapon. . . . My Administration has pursued an unprecedented level of military,
intelligence, and security cooperation with Israel . . . .
....
As I have underscored repeatedly, it is imperative that, even as we effectively cut off Iran’s
pathways to a nuclear weapon through implementation of the JCPOA, we take steps to
ensure that we and our allies and partners are more capable than ever to deal with Iran’s
destabilizing activities and support for terrorism. This involves deepened cooperation and
information sharing with Israel and our Gulf Cooperation Council partners; it also
involves continued enforcement of international and U.S. law, including sanctions related
to Iran’s non-nuclear activities. With very limited exceptions, Iran will continue to be
denied access to our market—the world’s largest—and we will maintain powerful sanctions targeting Iran’s support for groups such as Hizballah, its destabilizing role in Yemen,
its backing of the Assad regime, its missile program, and its human rights abuses at home.17
White House officials explained that “[w]hile many of the promises have been made before by
Mr. Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and others, . . . the letter represents the first time
that the president himself has compiled them under his name and in writing.”18
By September 2, 2015, the president had secured enough support from Democratic Senators to block the passage of a resolution of disapproval.19 The next week, Senate Democrats
did just that, ensuring that the JCPOA would take effect without the president needing to exercise a veto. The procedural vote in the Senate— on a measure that would have registered formal
disapproval of the deal—fell two short of the sixty that would have been required to break a
Democratic filibuster.20 As a result, the bill did not proceed to an up-or-down vote. Obama
15

Helen Cooper & Gardiner Harris, Top General Gives “Pragmatic” View of Iran Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July
29, 2015, at A10.
16
Letter from Barack Obama, President of the U.S. to Jerrold Nadler, U.S. Congressman (Aug. 19, 2015),
available at http://nadler.house.gov/sites/nadler.house.gov/files/documents/Letter%20to%20Congressman%20
Nadler%20re%20JCPOA.pdf.
17
Id.
18
Jonathan Weisman, In Letter, Obama Tells Congress U.S. Will Still Press Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2015,
at A3.
19
Kristina Peterson & Carol E. Lee, Obama Secures Votes on Iran, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2015, at A1.
20
Steinhauer, supra note 1.
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heralded the outcome, calling it “a victory for diplomacy, for American national security, and
for the safety and security of the world.”21
The Senate voted twice more on a resolution of disapproval, with the measure failing again
each time. The third—and final—attempt by Senate Republicans to pass a resolution disapproving of the deal failed on September 17, the last day of INARA’s sixty-day review period.22
In turn, House Republicans pushed House Speaker John Boehner to hold additional votes
concerning the measure. One vote concerned a bill approving of the JCPOA in order to force
Democrats to express their support on the record.23 The measure failed, with 244 Republicans
and 25 Democrats voting against expressing support for the deal, and 162 Democrats in favor.
The House successfully passed a resolution protesting that the White House had not disclosed
secret side agreements between Iran and the IAEA and a bill that would have prevented the
United States from lifting any sanctions on Iran.24 Because they lacked support in the Senate,
these measures did not proceed any further.
After these efforts to block implementation of the JCPOA failed and INARA’s sixty-day window expired, the administration began to take steps to implement the deal. The White House
announced that the president would issue waivers suspending all U.S. nuclear-related sanctions
on October 18, 2015.25 That date marked Adoption Day, the second of the five landmark days
that structure the JCPOA.26 Adoption Day marked ninety days after the passage— on July 20,
2015— of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA and
created the “snapback” provisions to enforce the terms of the agreement.27 The JCPOA provides that Iran will begin to provisionally apply the IAEA Additional Protocol on Adoption
Day, thereby allowing the IAEA to undertake additional inspections. In turn, the JCPOA
requires the European Union and United States to adopt regulations and issue waivers necessary to begin sanctions relief on Implementation Day, the third landmark day.28
On October 18, 2015—Adoption Day—Obama said:
Today marks an important milestone toward preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon and ensuring its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful going forward. On this
Adoption Day of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached between the
P5⫹1, EU, and Iran, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments. Today, Iran begins to take
the steps necessary to implement its JCPOA commitments, including removing thousands
21

Statement by the President, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 10, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/09/10/statement-president.
22
Karen DeYoung, Administration Prepares to Implement Iran Nuclear Deal as Republicans Fail to Stop It, WASH.
POST, Sept. 17, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/administration-prepares-toimplement-iran-nuclear-deal-as-republicans-again-fail-to-stop-it/2015/09/17/dc4053ec-5d81-11e5-9757e49273f05f65_story.html.
23
H.R. 3461, 114th Cong. (2015). See also David M. Herszenhorn, House Rejects Iran Nuclear Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2015, at A6.
24
H. Res. 411, 114th Cong. (2015) (finding that the president has not complied with section 2 of INARA). The
White House rejected the idea that any side deals existed. The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring
a Nuclear Weapon, THE WHITE HOUSE, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal/q-and-a
(last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
25
DeYoung, supra note 22.
26
See Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 1, at 650.
27
JCPOA, supra note 1, at 16; S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 10, ¶¶ 11–12.
28
See Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 1, at 650.
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of centrifuges and associated infrastructure, reducing its enriched uranium stockpile from
approximately 12,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms, and removing the core of the Arak
heavy-water reactor and filling it with concrete so that it cannot be used again, among other
steps. These next steps will allow us to reach the objectives we set out to achieve over the
course of nearly two years of tough, principled diplomacy and will result in cutting off all
four pathways Iran could use to develop enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. I am
confident in the extraordinary benefits to our national security and the peace and security
of the world that come with the successful implementation of the JCPOA.
I have directed that the heads of all relevant executive departments and agencies of the
United States begin preparations to implement the U.S. commitments in the JCPOA, in
accordance with U.S. law, including providing relief from nuclear-related sanctions as
detailed in the text of the JCPOA once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
has verified that Iran has completed all of its nuclear steps. We will also be closely monitoring Iran’s adherence to its commitments, working closely with the IAEA and the other
JCPOA participants, to ensure Iran fully fulfills each and every one of its commitments.29
Separately, Iran took steps to implement the JCPOA as well. The Iranian Parliament and
Guardian Council approved the deal.30 (The Guardian Council is a panel of clerics and jurists
with authority to review laws passed by the Parliament and to ratify them or to send them back
to Parliament if the Council concludes that the laws require further study.31) On October 15,
2015, Iran met an IAEA deadline for supplying information to the Agency on its past nuclear
work.32 The IAEA’s director general now has until December 15, 2015 to provide the “final
assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues.”33
United States and China Reach Agreement Regarding Economic Espionage and International
Cybersecurity Norms
On September 25, 2015, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States,
Xi and President Barack Obama announced an agreement relating to certain aspects of cyberrelations.1 Pursuant to the agreement, “[t]he United States and China agree that neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of
providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”2 The two countries
29
Statement on the Adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action To Prevent Iran From Obtaining a
Nuclear Weapon, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 734 (Oct. 18, 2015); see also Memorandum on Preparing for
Implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015 (JCPOA), 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 735 (Oct. 18, 2015).
30
Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Is Set to Put Nuclear Deal, Now Ratified, In Motion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2015,
at A9.
31
Id.
32
Rick Gladstone, Iran Meets Atomic Agency Deadline for Material on Past Activities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2015,
at A13.
33
IAEA Statement on Iran, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (Oct. 15, 2015), at https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-statement-iran-0.
1
See Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 25, 2015), at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-unitedstates [hereinafter Fact Sheet]; The President’s News Conference with President Xi Jinping of China, 2015 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 647 (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter News Conference].
2
Fact Sheet, supra note 1.
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also agreed to cooperate in addressing malicious cyberactivities. Specifically, the United States
and China agreed to provide “timely responses . . . to requests for information and assistance
concerning malicious cyber activities”; “to cooperate, in a manner consistent with their respective national laws and relevant international obligations, with requests to investigate cybercrimes, collect electronic evidence, and mitigate malicious cyber activity emanating from their
territory”; and “to provide updates on the status and results of those investigation[s] to the
other side, as appropriate.”3 Finally, the agreement indicated that “[b]oth sides are committed
to making common effort to further identify and promote appropriate norms of state behavior
in cyberspace within the international community.”4 This agreement addresses cyberactivity
in the pursuit of economic advantage, rather than those associated with “traditional intelligence-gathering functions”; Obama has described such cyberespionage as a “fundamentally
different” issue.5
Addressing the agreement at a joint press conference with President Xi, President Obama
said:
I raised once again our very serious concerns about growing cyber-threats to American
companies and American citizens. I indicated that it has to stop. The United States government does not engage in cyber economic espionage for commercial gain. And today,
I can announce that our two countries have reached a common understanding on the way
forward. We’ve agreed that neither the U.S. or the Chinese government will conduct or
knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or
other confidential business information for commercial advantage. In addition, we’ll work
together, and with other nations, to promote international rules of the road for appropriate
conduct in cyberspace.
So this is progress. But I have to insist that our work is not yet done. I believe we can expand
our cooperation in this area, even as the United States will continue to use all of the tools
at our disposal to protect American companies, citizens and interests.
....
3

Id.
Id.; see also News Conference, supra note 1 (statement of Xi, as translated) (“China and the United States are
two major cyber countries and we should strengthen dialogue and cooperation. Confrontation and friction are not
made by choice for both sides. During my visit, competent authorities of both countries have reached important
consensus on joint fight against cyber-crimes. Both sides agree to step up crime cases, investigation assistance and
information-sharing. And both government[s] will not be engaged in or knowingly support online theft of intellectual properties. And we will explore the formulation of appropriate state, behavior and norms of the cyberspace.
And we will establish a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on the fight against cyber-crimes and related issues, and
to establish hotline links.”).
5
Remarks by the President to the Business Roundtable, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 624 (2015) [hereinafter Roundtable Remarks] (“We have repeatedly said to the Chinese government that we understand traditional
intelligence-gathering functions that all states, including us, engage in. And we will do everything we can to stop
you from getting state secrets or transcripts of a meeting that I’ve had, but we understand you’re going to be trying
to do that. That is fundamentally different from your government or its proxies engaging directly in industrial espionage and stealing trade secrets, stealing proprietary information from companies. That we consider an act of aggression that has to stop.”); see also Conference Call to Preview the Visit of President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of
China, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 22, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/23/conference-call-preview-visit-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic [hereinafter Conference Call] (containing a statement from Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes that the U.S. concern
about Chinese cyber activities is not “a matter of whether or not countries conduct traditional espionage”).
4
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President Xi . . . indicated to me that, with 1.3 billion people, he can’t guarantee the
behavior of every single person on Chinese soil—which I completely understand. I can’t
guarantee the actions of every single American. What I can guarantee, though, and what
I’m hoping President Xi will show me, is that we are not sponsoring these activities, and
that when it comes to our attention that non-governmental entities or individuals are
engaging in this stuff, that we take it seriously and we’re cooperating to enforce the law.
The last point I’ll make on the cyber issue— because this is a global problem, and because,
unlike some of the other areas of international cooperation, the rules in this area are not
well developed, I think it’s going to very important for the United States and China, working with other nations and the United Nations and . . . the private sector, to start developing an architecture to govern behavior in cyberspace that is enforceable and clear.
It doesn’t mean that we’re going it prevent every cyber-crime, but it does start to serve as
a template whereby countries know what the rules are, they’re held accountable, and we’re
able to jointly go after non-state actors in this area.6
Obama and Xi reached the agreement during their talks at the White House on September
24 –25.7 But the substance of the agreement had been “in the works” several weeks before that,
with discussions beginning after China’s alleged theft of records from the Office of Personnel
Management, and continuing when National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice traveled to Beijing in late August to prepare for Xi’s visit to the White House.8 Following those conversations,
Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of
China Meng Jianzhu—acting as a Special Envoy for Xi—met with senior administration officials in Washington from September 9 –12 to discuss cybersecurity issues,9 leading to “substantial agreement” on those topics, including Chinese economic espionage.10 At the time,
6

News Conference, supra note 1; see also id. (statement of Xi) (“With President Obama and I have on many occasions—and this is a long history— have exchange of views on this. I think it’s fair to say we’ve reached a lot of consensus on cybersecurity, including some new consensus. Overall, the United States is the strongest country in terms
of cyber strength. China is the world’s biggest cyber country in terms of the number of Web users. We have more
than 600 million of netizens. Our two sides should cooperate because cooperation will benefit both, and confrontation will lead to losses on both sides. We are entirely able to carry out government department and expert levels
of dialogue and exchanges to strengthen our cooperation in many respects and turn the cybersecurity between the
two countries into a new growth source, rather than a point of confrontation between the two sides. China strongly
opposes and combats the theft of commercial secrets and other kinds of hacking attacks. The U.S. side, if has concerns in this respect, we can, through the exiting channels, express those concerns. The Chinese side will take seriously the U.S. provision of any information. Now, we have already, and in the future, we will still, through the law
enforcement authorities, maintain communication and coordination on this matter, and appropriately address
them. So, all in all, we have broad, common interest in the field of the cyber. But we need to strengthen cooperation
and avoid leading to confrontation. And nor should we politicize this issue. During my current visit, I think it’s fair
to say that the two sides, concerning combatting cyber-crimes, have reached a lot of consensus. Going forward, we
need to, at an early date, reach further agreement on them and further put them on the ground.”).
7
Fact Sheet, supra note 1.
8
Ellen Nakashima & Steven Mufson, The U.S. and China Agree Not to Conduct Economic Espionage in
Cyberspace, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-usand-china-agree-not-to-conduct-economic-espionage-in-cyberspace/2015/09/25/1c03f4b8-63a2-11e5-8e9edce8a2a2a679_story.html.
9
Readout of Senior Administration Officials’ Meeting with Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Meng Jianzhu, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 12, 2015), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/12/readout-senior-administration-officials-meeting-secretarycentral.
10
Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Won’t Impose Sanctions on Chinese Companies Before Xi Visit, WASH. POST, Sept.
14, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-us-will-not-impose-sanctions-on-
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administration officials characterized those talks as “pretty blunt” and “pretty ugly,”11 and it
was unclear whether a final agreement would be reached during Xi’s visit.12
According to press reports, China agreed to affirm the norm against economic cyberespionage in part because it was “rattled” by the threat of U.S. sanctions.13 Last April, Obama had
issued an executive order permitting the imposition of sanctions on individuals or entities that
engage in malicious cyberenabled activities, including economic espionage, that threaten the
United States’ interests.14 So far no such sanctions have been imposed, but press reports indicated that the administration was contemplating sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals.15 An administration official acknowledged that the United States decided to refrain
from issuing any sanctions prior to Xi’s visit, in light of the progress made during the discussions between Meng and senior administration officials.16 Such sanctions do remain a possibility, however. During Xi’s visit, Obama reiterated that the administration “will apply [sanctions] and whatever other tools [the United States] ha[s] in [its] toolkit to go after cyber
criminals, either retrospectively or prospectively,” where there is “proof that they’ve gone after
U.S. companies or U.S. persons.”17
In his announcement of the agreement, Obama noted that the primary question is now
whether China’s “words [will be] followed by actions.”18 Indeed, at a congressional hearing
several days after the agreement was reached, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work said,
“I think all of us have some healthy skepticism about this, but I believe it’s a good confidencebuilding measure and a good first step, and we will see if it leads to better behavior on the part
of the Chinese.”19 Explaining the agreement, Work said:
chinese-companies-before-state-visit-by-president-xi-jinping/2015/09/14/98a447e6-5b25-11e5-b38e06883aacba64_story.html.
11
David E. Sanger, Cyberthreat Posed by China and Iran Confounds White House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2015,
at A6.
12
See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & David E. Sanger, Obama and Xi Jinping of China Agree to Steps on Cybertheft, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2015, at A9.
13
See Nakashima & Mufson, supra note 8; see also U.S. Cybersecurity Policy and Threats: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 114th Cong. 74 –75 (2015) (quoting Director of National Intelligence James Clapper as
saying “it appears that the threat of potential economic sanctions, particularly imposing them right before the visit
of President Xi, I think, got their attention”), available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
15-75%20-%209-29-15.pdf [hereinafter Hearing].
14
See Nakashima & Mufson, supra note 8; see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary
Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 643, 658 (2015) (discussing the content and scope of the executive order).
15
Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Developing Sanctions Against China over Cyberthefts, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2015,
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/administration-developing-sanctions-againstchina-over-cyberespionage/2015/08/30/9b2910aa-480b-11e5-8ab4-c73967a143d3_story.html. See Press Gaggle
with Press Secretary Josh Earnest en Route Dillingham, AK, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 2, 2015), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/03/press-gaggle-press-secretary-josh-earnest-en-route-dillinghamak (“I . . . don’t have much I can say publicly about any steps related to economic sanctions that we’re contemplating.”); see Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 31, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/
08/246473.htm#CHINA (“[W]e ha[ve] nothing to announce in terms of economic . . . sanctions. Certainly, that
remains a tool in the proverbial toolbox when we look at these kinds of situations, but I’m not saying we’re moving
forward in that direction.”).
16
Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Won’t Impose Sanctions on Chinese Companies Before Xi Visit, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-us-will-not-impose-sanctionson-chinese-companies-before-state-visit-by-president-xi-jinping/2015/09/14/98a447e6-5b25-11e5-b38e06883aacba64_story.html.
17
News Conference, supra note 1.
18
Id.
19
See Hearing, supra note 13, at 54.
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[O]ne hopes that . . . this agreement may create the space for us to have a—more than a
conversation, but one that would lead to some kind of a change in behavior on the part
of these state actors. . . . [W]hat we have done [after identifying the source of a cyber
attack] is, we have confronted China, and China, in some cases, has said, “Look, this was
a hacker that was insider our country, but we had no control over him.” What this [agreement] allows us to do is say, “Okay, well, what are you going to do about that? That’s a
cybercrime. Are you going to provide us the information we need to prosecute this person?
Are you going to take care of it on your own?”20
In the weeks after the agreement was reached, China arrested several Chinese hackers that
U.S. officials had identified as having stolen commercial secrets from U.S. firms with the intention of giving or selling that information to Chinese state-run companies.21 A report by private
researchers showed, however, that hackers linked to the Chinese government have continued
to try to acquire confidential information by accessing U.S. technology and pharmaceutical
companies’ networks.22 Administration officials are aware of that report, but have declined to
comment on it.23 U.S. Cyber Command’s Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. James K. McLaughlin pointed out that the elimination of Chinese economic cyberespionage will take time, and
it may simply be “too early . . . to see any of th[e] changes” called for by the agreement.24
USE OF FORCE AND ARMS CONTROL
United States Ratifies the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism
On September 30, 2015, the United States ratified the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,1 which President George W. Bush had signed on
September 14, 2005.2 The need for implementing legislation that would align U.S. law with
the Convention’s requirements caused the delay between signing and ratification. Congress
ultimately passed such legislation on June 2, 2015, as part of the USA Freedom Act.3
The Bush administration had submitted the Convention to the Senate for its advice and
consent eight years ago, on July 12, 2007.4 In its letter of transmittal to the Senate, the administration urged the Senate to “give early and favorable consideration” to the Convention
20

Id. at 53.
Ellen Nakashima & Adam Goldman, In a First, Chinese Hackers Are Arrested at the Behest of the U.S. Government, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-afirst-chinese-hackers-are-arrested-at-the-behest-of-the-us-government/2015/10/09/0a7b0e46-677811e5-8325-a42b5a459b1e_story.html. China has not indicated if it will prosecute these hackers. See id.
22
Ellen Nakashima, China Still Trying to Hack U.S. Firms Despite Xi’s Vow to Refrain, Analysts Say, WASH.
POST, Oct. 19, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-still-trying-to-hackus-firms-despite-xis-vow-to-refrain-analysts-say/2015/10/18/d9a923fe-75a8-11e5-b9c1-f03c48c96ac2_story.
html.
23
Id.
24
Id.
1
U.S. Ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Sept. 30, 2012), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/247636.htm [hereinafter U.S. Ratification];
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, opened for signature Sept. 14, 2005,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-4, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter NTC].
2
George W. Bush, Letter of Transmittal, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-4, 2005 WL 5653114 ( July 12, 2007) [hereinafter Letter of Transmittal].
3
USA Freedom Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, §§ 811–12, 129 Stat. 268, 309 –13 (2015).
4
Letter of Transmittal, supra note 2, at III.
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because of its importance to “the campaign against international terrorism.”5 Bush cited two
features of the Convention as especially noteworthy. First, the Convention “imposes binding
legal obligations upon States Parties either to submit for prosecution or to extradite any person
within their jurisdiction” who aids, attempts, commits, or threatens to commit “terrorist acts
involving radioactive material or a nuclear device.”6 Second, the Convention requires parties
“to provide one another legal assistance in investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings” initiated in response to violations of the treaty.7
On September 25, 2008, the Senate passed a resolution of ratification in support of the Convention.8 The Senate’s consent was subject to one reservation and several understandings of the
Convention, all of which the Bush administration had urged the Senate to adopt.9 The reservation— explicitly permitted by the agreement’s text10— opted out of the Convention’s dispute settlement provision.11
The Bush administration then proposed implementing legislation to Congress.12 Disagreements about two provisions in the proposed legislation kept it from being adopted promptly.
The first of these contested provisions would authorize the federal government to investigate
suspected acts of nuclear terrorism through surveillance of electronic communication;13 the
second would authorize the death penalty for violations of the Convention that resulted in
death.14 The Obama administration supported including the provisions in order to implement
the Convention’s requirements that states parties investigate and appropriately punish violations of the Convention.15 Nonetheless, the administration acknowledged that the wiretap and
death penalty provisions were not “strictly required” since the Convention did not demand any
specific investigative techniques or sentencing standards.16
5

Id.
Id.
7
Id.
8
154 CONG. REC. S9554-56 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008).
9
Id. at S9555; Letter of Transmittal, supra note 2, at III.
10
NTC, supra note 1, art. 23(2).
11
154 CONG. REC. S9555.
12
See Implementation of Certain International Nuclear and Maritime Terrorism Agreements: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 26 (2011)
[hereinafter Hearing on the Nuclear Terrorism Convention] (statement of Thomas M. Countryman, Assistant Sec’y,
Bureau of Int’l Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Dep’t of State).
13
S. 1318 114th Cong. § 203(c) (2015).
14
Id. § 201(a) (“Penalties.—Any person who violates this section shall be punished as provided under section
2332a(a).”); 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (“A person who, without lawful authority, uses, threatens, or attempts or conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction . . . shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death
results, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”); Hearing on the Nuclear Terrorism
Convention, supra note 12, at 2–3 (statement of Robert C. Scott, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security).
15
Hearing on the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 12, app. 37 (response to hearing questions from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legislative Aff., U.S. Department of Justice); see also NTC, supra note 1,
art. 10(1) (stating that a state party shall, upon receiving information that a violation of the treaty has occurred, “take
such measures as may be necessary under its national law to investigate the facts contained in the information”); id.
art. 5(b) (requiring states parties to make violations of the treaty “punishable by appropriate penalties which take
into account the grave nature of these offences”); Letter from Judith C. Applebaum, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs, to Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary ( June 21, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ola/legacy/2012/10/31/06-21-12-ltrre-hr-5889.pdf.
16
Hearing on the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 12, app. 37.
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In 2012, the House of Representatives passed a compromise bill that omitted the wiretap
and death penalty provisions.17 However, the House bill stalled in the Senate due to persistent
disagreements about the two provisions.18 According to Senator Chuck Grassley, who led
efforts to include the controversial provisions, “it’s obvious that the government needs the ability to seek the death penalty for nuclear terrorists under the appropriate circumstances,” and
it’s important that “authorities have the capacity to seek lawful wiretaps, authorized by a federal
judge, to investigate these terrorists.”19 Others in Congress disagreed and claimed that even if
the provisions were required by the Convention, existing federal law already permitted wiretaps to investigate and the death penalty to punish terrorist acts.20
Congress finally enacted implementing legislation for the Convention on June 2, 2015, as
part of the USA Freedom Act.21 The legislation reflected the House version of the bill, which
omitted additional wiretap authorities or specific authorizations for capital punishment. The
legislation did include a provision criminalizing any action that “increases the risk of the release
of radioactive material,”22 and another that criminalized inchoate acts of nuclear terrorism,
such as attempts and conspiracies to engage in nuclear terrorism.23 Furthermore, the implementing legislation authorized U.S. jurisdiction over acts of nuclear terrorism that occur on
vessels or aircrafts registered with the United States24 and over violators of the Convention
found in the United States.25 In his speech on the passage of the USA Freedom Act, Secretary
of State John Kerry lauded the Convention for providing “a specific legal basis for international
cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of those who commit terrorist
17

H.R. 5889, 112th Cong. (2012).
Patrick Leahy, Letter to the Editor, Nuclear Terrorism Bill Delay Unwarranted, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2012),
at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/19/nuclear-terrorism-bill-delay-unwarranted; Diana
Barnes, Adoption of Nuclear Security Pacts Stalls in Senate, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Sept. 27, 2012), at
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/adoption-nuclear-security-pacts-stalls-senate.
19
Grassley and Whitehouse Introduce Legislation to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and Proliferation, CHUCK GRASSLEY (May 13, 2015), at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-and-whitehouse-introducelegislation-combat-nuclear-terrorism-and.
20
See 161 Cong. Rec. S4176 (daily ed. June 16, 2015) (statement of Sen. Reed) (“[W]e have been advised by
the Department of Justice that these provisions are not necessary, given the scope of existing law with respect to
terrorists and with respect to anyone who conducts a terrorist act.”); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332(a), 2332b(a),
2332f(a), 2332h, 2339A, 2339B, 2516(1)(q), 3592(c)(9).
21
USA Freedom Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, §§ 811–12, 129 Stat. 268, 309 –13 (2015).
22
Id. § 811(a), 129 Stat. at 309 (implementing NTC Article 2(1)(b), which states that a person commits an
offense under the treaty when that person “uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the
release of radioactive material”).
23
Id. § 811(a), 129 Stat. at 309 (implementing NTC Article 2(3), which states that “[a]ny person also commits
an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article” and NTC
Article 2(4), which states that “[a]ny person also commits an offence if that person: (a) Participates as an accomplice
in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article; or (b) Organizes or directs others to commit
an offence as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article; or (c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article by a group of persons acting
with a common purpose . . . ”).
24
Id. § 811(a), 129 Stat. at 309 –10 (implementing NTC Article 9(1)(b), which requires that “[e]ach State Party
shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2
when . . . (b) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that State or an aircraft which is registered
under the laws of that State at the time the offence is committed”).
25
Id. § 811(a), 129 Stat. at 310 (implementing NTC Article 9(4), which requires that “[e]ach State Party shall
likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2
in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite that person to any of the States
Parties which have established their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article”).
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acts involving radioactive material or a nuclear device, or any device that may emit radiation
or disperse radioactive material.”26
With the implementing legislation in place, the Obama administration deposited an instrument of ratification at the United Nations on September 30, 2015.27 The United States
became the 100th state party to the Convention, and the administration praised the Convention as “a cornerstone of the global nuclear security and counter terrorism architecture.”28 The
administration recognized the continuing threats posed by nuclear and radioactive material
and called on nations around the world to continue to “work to eliminate the threat of nuclear
terrorism.”29
United States Reaches Agreement with Turkey on Use of Incirlik Air Base for Strikes on ISIL;
“Safe Zone” Not Part of the Deal
In July 2015, the United States and Turkey announced an agreement granting the United
States access to Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey for launching air attacks against the Islamic
State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL).1 Details of the deal have not been released “due to operational security”2 and ongoing negotiations about the precise details of the countries’ cooperation.3 Incirlik is a fifteen-minute flight from the Syrian border, and access to the base allows
U.S. aircraft to carry out operations in Syria more effectively than other options in the Middle
East.4 Prior to the deal, Turkey had allowed the United States to use Incirlik only for surveillance missions by unarmed drones.5 Within weeks of the announcement, the United States had
deployed Air Force fighter planes and personnel to the base,6 launched manned airstrikes from
26
Passage of Implementing Legislation for Nuclear Security Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( June 4, 2015), at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/06/243196.htm.
27
U.S. Ratification, supra note 1.
28
Id.
29
Id.
1
Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( July 24, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/07/
245262.htm; see also No. 212, 24 July 2015, Press Release Concerning Turkey-US Understanding on Countering
DAESH, TURK. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. ( July 24, 2015), at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-212_-24-july-2015_press-statement-concerning-turkey_us-understanding-on-countering-deash.en.mfa.
2
Ceylan Yeginsu & Helene Cooper, U.S. Jets to Use Turkish Bases in War on ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2015,
at A1.
3
See Senior Administration Officials On Counter-ISIL Coalition Efforts, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( July 28, 2015),
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245403.htm (stating that the “mechanisms [and] modalities” of
Turkish-U.S. cooperation are still being discussed); Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary
Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 25, 2015), at http://www.defense.gov/
News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/614829/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagonpress-secretary-peter-cook-in [hereinafter Cook Press Briefing] (stating that U.S. “cooperation with the
Turks . . . remains a work in progress . . . ”).
4
Dan Lamothe, Here Are the First Images of U.S. F-16 Fighters Flying from Turkey to Carry Out Airstrikes, WASH.
POST, Aug. 13, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/08/13/here-are-the-firstimages-of-u-s-f-16-fighters-flying-from-turkey-to-carry-out-airstrikes.
5
Liz Sly & Karen DeYoung, Turkey Agrees to Allow U.S. Military to Use its Base to Attack Islamic State, WASH.
POST, July 23, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkey-agrees-to-allow-us-militaryto-use-its-base-to-attack-islamic-state/2015/07/23/317f23aa-3164-11e5-a879-213078d03dd3_story.html.
6
Incirlik AB Receives F-16 Forces in Support of OIR, U.S. AIR FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND (Aug. 10, 2015),
at http://www.afcent.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/136/Article/612987/incirlik-ab-receives-f-16-forces-insupport-of-oir.aspx.
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Turkey into Syria,7 and finalized details for full Turkish inclusion in the U.S.-led coalition air
operations against ISIL.8 According to press reports, one senior administration official
described the agreement as a “game changer.”9
Shortly after the Incirlik announcement, discrepancies between public statements by U.S.
and Turkish officials led to some confusion about a rumored agreement to create a “safe zone”
inside northern Syria along the Turkish border.10 The legality of carving out such a space
within Syrian territory has been debated since Turkey first proposed the idea.11 In the past,
Turkey had insisted that any air base permissions granted to the United States would be conditioned on the establishment of a safe zone inside Syria, protected by U.S. air power.12 Turkey
envisioned encouraging Syrian refugees who had fled their country to return to this protected
area, easing the pressure on neighboring countries that have absorbed more than four million
Syrian refugees.13 After the announcement of the Incirlik deal, Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan appeared to suggest a connection between that agreement and “the creation
of a safe zone there [in Syria that] will lay the ground for 1.7 [million Syrian] citizens here to
return home.”14 His vision was echoed by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, who
suggested that once the U.S.-Turkish Incirlik agreement is effectuated, “safe zones will be
formed naturally.”15
Contrary to initial suggestions from Ankara, however, the United States has maintained
that references to a safe zone are “getting ahead of what’s actually happening,” which is “an
agreement to use Turkish facilities to enhance . . . air operations against ISIL on the
ground.”16 U.S. officials did acknowledge ongoing discussions with Ankara about how to
“clear out . . . the last stretch of international border with Turkey that is controlled by
ISIL.” But officials from the U.S. State Department and Defense Department emphasized
7

US Begins Manned Airstrikes Against ISIS from Turkey into Syria, U.S. AIR FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
(Aug. 13, 2015), at http://www.afcent.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/136/Article/613418/us-begins-mannedairstrikes-against-isis-from-turkey-into-syria.aspx.
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Cook Press Briefing, supra note 3.
9
Yeginsu & Cooper, supra note 2.
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The media has used the phrases buffer zone, protected zone, and safe zone interchangeably.
11
See Molly O’Toole, Pentagon Doesn’t Know If It’s Allowed to Defend Syrian Fighters or Turkish “Safe Zone”,
DEFENSE ONE ( July 28, 2015) at http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/07/pentagon-approval-fight-syria/
118675; Erin Cunningham, U.S., Turkey Aim to Create Buffer Zone on Syrian Border. Nobody Knows How., WASH.
POST, Aug. 13, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/us-said-it-will-create-a-safe-zoneon-syrian-border-but-nobody-knows-how/2015/08/12/4c7d0baa-37e4-11e5-ab7b-6416d97c73c2_story.html.
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August 2015 Monthly Forecast: Syria, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT ( July 31, 2015), at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-08/syria_22.php.
13
See Sly & DeYoung, supra note 5 (explaining the safe zone long imagined by the Turkish government); Dan
Lamothe, The Many Complications of the U.S. Establishing a Military “Safe Zone” in Syria with Turkey, WASH. POST,
July 27, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/07/27/the-many-complicationsof-the-u-s-establishing-a-military-safe-zone-in-syria-with-turkey (enumerating refugee numbers).
14
Turkey’s Erdoğan Demands Lifting of HDP Deputies’ Immunity, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Turk.) ( July 28,
2015), at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-vows-more-military-ops-says-parliament-should-lift-immunity-of-terrorism-linked-deputies.aspx?pageID⫽517&nID⫽86038&NewsCatID⫽338.
15
Anne Barnard et al., Turkey and U.S. Plan to Create Syria “Safe Zone” Free of ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 2015, at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/world/middleeast/turkey-and-us-agree-on-plan-to-clear-isisfrom-strip-of-northern-syria.html.
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Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 11, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/08/
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that “there’s no imposition of a no-fly zone”17 and that they “haven’t mentioned or discussed a safe zone . . . .”18
In addition to the “military, financial, [and] humanitarian challenges” cited by a State
Department spokesperson,19 there would be significant legal hurdles to any safe zone proposal.
Since 2014, Syria has indicated that it would not consent to the creation of a protected space
within its borders and would consider any such imposition an “attack on Syrian territory and
its sovereignty.”20 Given Syria’s resistance, force would likely be necessary to create and protect
a safe zone,21 and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has reportedly expressed uncertainty
about whether the Pentagon has legal authority to engage Syrian government troops.22
While the United States has remained mostly silent about the legality of Turkey’s proposal,
Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov has asserted that only the UN Security Council
has the ability to authorize the creation of such a zone inside Syria.23 Given Russia’s Security
Council veto power, no such resolution seems likely.24 In September 2014, Karlov warned that
“these well-intentioned steps if not approved by the U.N. Security Council could bring more
evil.”25 “It should not be forgotten,” he said, “that ‘[t]he road to hell is paved with good intentions.’”26 Absent Security Council approval, any safe zone in Syria would likely have to rely on
the much more uncertain grounds of either humanitarian considerations27 or self-defense.28
17
Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( July 27, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/07/
245313.htm.
18
Cook Press Briefing, supra note 3.
19
Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( June 29, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/06/
244480.htm.
20
Brandon Turbeville, NATO’s Dream Coming True—Turkey Pushes for Syria No-Fly Zone; US Approves,
GLOBAL RESEARCH (Can.) (Oct. 3, 2014), at http://www.globalresearch.ca/natos-dream-coming-true-turkeypushes-for-syria-no-fly-zone-us-approves/5406399 (quoting a statement by Syrian Foreign Minister Waleed
Muallem in an interview with Lebanese television outlet Al-Meyadin). See also Manal Ismael, Foreign Ministry: Syria
Categorically Rejects Setting Up Buffer Zone on its Lands, SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 16, 2014), at http://
sana.sy/en/?p⫽15432 (citing letters from Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates to the UN SecretaryGeneral and Security Council, stating that “the Syrian government categorically rejects setting up any buffer or ‘safe’
zones” and will take “all necessary measures to preserve its national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity”).
21
See Syria Safe Zone Would Require “Combat Mission”, THE DAILY STAR (Leb.) (May 6, 2015, 8:11 PM), at
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/May-06/297071-syria-safe-zone-would-require-combat-mission-us.ashx (quoting U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stating that “[w]e would need to fight
to create such a space and then fight to keep such a space . . . ”).
22
O’Toole, supra note 11.
23
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NEWS (Turk.) (Sept. 22, 2014), at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/un-to-decide-on-no-fly-zone-on-turkishsyrian-border-russian-envoy.aspx?PageID⫽238&NID⫽72007&NewsCatID⫽359.
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access to people in need. See S.C. Res. 2139 (Feb. 22, 2014); S.C. Res. 2165 ( July 14, 2014); S.C. Res. 2191 (Dec.
17, 2014).
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https://www.lawfareblog.com/buffer-zone-inside-syria-and-its-complications (distinguishing the legal implications of a buffer zone created to expel ISIL—which may fall under the banner of self-defense—and a buffer zone
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In addition to the legal hurdles to establishing a safe zone, humanitarian and political concerns have also been expressed. UN Aid Chief Stephen O’Brien warned Turkey against calling
any planned buffer a “safe zone” absent a guarantee of protection for civilians who might
return.29 Commentators have also speculated that Turkey’s cooperation in the fight against
ISIL has merely provided “cover” for it to attack Kurdish rebels along the Syrian border.30
When questioned about Turkish airstrikes against both ISIL and Kurdish targets following the
Incirlik deal, a U.S. State Department spokesperson dismissed the simultaneous timing of the
attacks as “coincidence.”31 U.S. officials have consistently defended Turkey’s right to defense
of its territorial integrity against hostile Kurdish separatists,32 while simultaneously supporting
Kurdish forces in Syria that have at least some connection to Kurdish militants in Turkey.33
So far, President Barack Obama’s administration has continued to reject proposals for a safe
zone. At a press conference in October 2015, Obama described them as “half-baked
ideas . . . [that] downplay the challenges involved in this situation.”34 He suggested that hard
questions needed to be answered before endorsing such a proposal, asking “specifically, precisely, what exactly would you do, and how would you fund it, and how would you sustain
it . . . . [T]ypically, what you get is a bunch of mumbo jumbo.”35 Despite this skepticism, press
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